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Existe um dilema ao governo sobre a forma de financiamento e gestão dos projetos de 
infra-estrutura: investimento público tradicional ou PPP. Assume-se que há ineficiência do 
governo para a execução dos investimentos públicos tradicionais implicando em “sobrecusto” à 
obra. Nos contratos de PPP, por outro lado, o parceiro privado exige um prêmio de risco ao 
governo, aumentando o valor da contraprestação pública. Este trabalho tem o objetivo de analisar 
a relação entre a taxa de premio ao risco exigido pelo parceiro privado nos contratos de parcerias 
público-privadas e o grau de ineficiência assumido ao setor público na provisão de infra-
estrutura. Foi estabelecida a taxa de equivalência entre prêmio ao risco e ineficiência pública por 
meio de cálculos financeiros. Dessa forma, o governo dispõe de um indicador para subsídio à 
tomada de decisão entre investimento público ou PPP. Caso o governo disponha de estimativa 
sobre sua ineficiência por meio das diversas metodologias de análise de eficiência, dado prêmio 
de risco exigido pelo setor privado, pode-se decidir de forma ótima o meio para implementação 
da infra-estrutura publica. 





There is a dilemma about the way that public sector should finance and manage 
infrastructure projects: traditional public investment or PPP. It is assumed that government is 
inefficient on traditional public investments execution that implies an "indirect cost" over project's 
construction. On the other hand, private partners demand a risk premium on PPP contracts, 
increasing the value of government contractual costs. This work analyzes the relation between the 
risk premium demanded by the private partner in contracts of public-private partnerships and the 
assumed public sector inefficiency degree on infrastructure provision. This work makes use of 
financial calculus to determine the equivalent rate of premium risk and government’s inefficiency. 
As a result, government has an instrument to subsidy the decision between public investment and 
PPP. If government has estimation about its inefficiency by different kinds of methodologies, for a 
private premium risk demanded, it can decide the optimal form to implement infrastructure projects. 
Keywords: Public-Private Partnership, Inefficiency, Investment, Government.   
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 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are contracts that private sector offers infrastructure 
assets and services that is traditionally been provided by government. PPPs can be attractive for 
both government and private sector. For the government, private financing can provide 
expansion of the infrastructure without immediately pressure on tax burden or debt. Similarly, 
better management of the private sector, as its ability to innovate, can lead to increase efficiency, 
improving quality and costs of services. 
PPPs appeared in the end of the 90s, period that privatizations were losing space 
compared on its previous time. The goal of PPP was getting private capital and expertise to 
manage investments in infrastructure where privatization had failed to act or had obstacles. 
Currently, many countries of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) have a consolidated program of public-private partnerships. England is one of the most 
advanced countries related to PPP programs. PPP programs represent 14% of total public 
investment and have showed positive results
1. However, according to IMF (2004), it is still early 
to establish conclusions of the benefits of this program, especially in emerging countries. 
There is no consensus regarding the definition of PPP between countries, this program 
has two important characteristics: (i) provision of a service and investment by private partner and 
(ii) transference of risks from government to private sector. 
According to Borges and Neves (2005), PPP idea must be compared to a leasing 
operation, where government rents (contracts) a service provided by private sector, even if the 
partner has to construct infra-structure
2 before operating. The private partner must be 
remunerated only if the service is given as satisfactory. Assets should be reversible to concessor 
power at the end of the contractual period. This model is called “built, operate and transfer” 
(BOT). 
PPP accounting is an important aspect to be considered by the government. According to 
Sadka (2006), it is possible that the idea of the PPPs has been "invented" out of a desire to 
circumvent regular budgetary procedures. The accounting registration of a traditional public 
investment is made on the infrastructure construction time. Differently, PPPs expenditures is 
calculated and registered along the time of the contract, as a "rent" of good or service. By this 
reason, government assumes payment obligations for future taxpayers. 
It is necessary transparency on future commitments assumed by each part, either in 
relation to public sector future payments as on risks shared by private and public partner. 
Moreover, government should verify the fiscal impacts of these commitments on the 
sustainability of public accounts. Contracts of PPPs are potential contingent liabilities that can 
provoke fiscal and credibility instability to the government fiscal policy. 
FMI (2004) mentions that PPP contracts involve a range of different risks. These can be 
usefully divided into five categories (somewhat overlapping): (i) construction risk, which is 
related to design problems, building cost overruns, and project delays; (ii) financial risk, which is 
related to variability in interest rates, exchange rates, and other factors affecting the financing 
costs; (iii) performance risk, which is related to the availability of an asset, continuity and quality 
of service provision; (iv) demand risk, which is related to the ongoing need of services; (v) 
residual risk, which is related to the future market price of an asset. 
These risks are present on public, private and public-private investments. One of the 
objectives of the PPPs is to transfer part of these risks from government to private sector [Borges 
and Neves (2005)]. Even applying private capital and changing administrative responsibility of 
infrastructure cause benefits by themselves, risk transference is necessary for the full exploitation 
of these changes, and to develop a correct incentives structure to private partner. The private 
                                                           
1 Independent studies mentioned in IMF (2004). 
2 If necessary. 
  1sector must consider risks taken to make decisions. Decision is expected to be more efficient if 
risks are considerated. 
On the moment that government analyzes which method should be applied for financing 
investment (traditional public contracts or PPP), it should analyze the value for money (VFM) of 
the procurement. VFM is defined by Borges and Neves (2005) as the quantification of the 
difference between construction and management of an asset by State or private partner, 
considering risks, benefits and costs. In accordance to Department of Finance and 
Administration of the Australian Government (2007), value for money can be revealed as: (i) the 
delivery of a service or capability at a lower cost; (ii) greater certainty of the financial outcome 
due to less exposure to significant risks; (iii) increased benefits to the end-users of a service due 
to the public sector's focus on service delivery rather than asset procurement. 
The government and private partner typically adopt different methods for pricing market 
risk. Government tends to use the risk free interest rate to discount future cash flows when 
appraising projects, while private bidders, for PPP projects, will include a risk premium in the 
discount rate to future project earnings. As a consequence, according to FMI (2004), the choice 
between public investment and PPP may be biased in favor of public investment. 
However, the argument of the private sector higher efficiency (lower cost) for provision 
of goods and services (or construction and management of an asset) can be used to justify the 
option of PPP, even if this option is financial costly. This article has the objective to analyze the 
relation between private sector demanded risk premium and the “supposed” inefficiency degree 
of the public sector on infrastructure provision. It is calculated the indifference curve of private 
risk premium and public sector inefficiency. The objective of this curve is to develop a tool to be 
considered on the decision for infrastructure provision between public investment and PPP.  
This work has six sections. In section two, it is presented legal and institutional aspects of 
the PPP in Brazil. Third section treats about the theory and references about the estimation of the 
public inefficiency and the trade-off between the public inefficiency and private risk premium. 
The financial model that calculates the indifference curve of private risk premium and public 
sector inefficiency are presented in section four. Section five simulates indifference curve 
considering different scenarios. Finally, the last section presents the main results and conclusions 
of this article. 
 
 
2.  PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP REGULATION IN BRAZIL 
 
In Brazil, the regulation for PPP contracts of Federal Government is established in Law 
11,079/2004. This law is a complement of Law 8,987/95 that treats about contracts of common 
public concession (financially sustainable). Contracts of PPP must take at least 5 years and 
minimum value of R$ 20 millions (or US$ 11.8 millions). It can not have as a unique objective: 
(i) contract labor, (ii) equipment supply or installation, or (iii) just a construction of an infra-
structure. 
According to that Law, PPP contracts are classified in two categories: “sponsored 
concessions” and “administrative concessions”.  Sponsored concessions are contracts which 
private partner can charge users for utilization of goods or services. Government participates on 
the contract sponsoring financially the project to make it economically viable (Example: roads). 
Administrative concessions are those cases when the State is direct or indirect user of the 
concession and is responsible exclusively for the flow of payments to the private partner 
(Example: penitentiaries). 
PPP agreements require private partner to create Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
 3. SPV is 
responsible for the service established on the contract. Government cannot participate of that 
                                                           
3 In Portuguese, Sociedade de Propósito Específico (SPE). 
  2society. SPV must follow corporative governance standards and adopt standardized and 
transparency accounting principals. One of the advantages of SPV creation requirement is the 
idea of funding diversify. In accordance to Borges and Neves (2005), there are similar 
characteristics of “project finance” and PPP financial design which involves agents able to 
develop sophisticated financial structures for attainment of established goals. Common elements 
of these structures are: (i) securitization of future receipts flow on market negotiated bonds; (ii) 
focus in infrastructure concession rules and; (iii) techniques of risk dilution and mitigation. 
Federal Decree 5,385/2005 regulates the PPP Management Committee (CGP)
4. The 
Committee is responsible for: (i) definition of priorities services to be managed by PPP regime; 
(ii) discipline procedures and issues of PPP contracts; (iii) authorization of procurement process 
and approve its results and; (IV) appreciation of balances and reports of PPP contracts under 
execution. The CGP is formed by a member of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and 
Management (MPOG), Ministry of Finance and Presidential Staff Office. MPOG is responsible 
to evaluate the merit of the project. Treasury Department has the duty to analyze government 
expenses on PPP contracts and its limit of 1% of Net Current Revenues
5 (RCL)
6.  
In 2005, it was created Government Public-Private Partnership Trust Fund
7 (FGP). The 
objective is to guarantee the private sector of public financial commitments. If government 
becomes default on its payments, private partner can request PPP Trust Fund its financial 
receipts rights. Initially, Federal Government funded R$ 6 billions composed by Vale do Rio 
Doce, Eletrobras and Banco do Brasil bonds on stock market. The Fund is managed by Banco do 
Brasil, an independent state owned firm. It is expected that FGP reduces the financial risk of 
government default of its payment obligations and, as a consequence, the financial cost to the 
project
8. 
Law 11.079/ 2004 establishes limits for Federal Government to contract PPP project. 
Federal Government is only allowed to contract PPP if the sum of the annual government 
financial obligations of contracts (payments) is inferior to 1% of the Net Current Revenues 
(RCL) for the next projected ten years. The objective of this restriction is to guarantee fiscal 
responsibility of public accounts. PPP contracts can compromise future resources and be 
transformed into contingent liabilities. 
Art. 28 of PPP Law expand this limit to States and Municipals. In this case, Federal 
Government suspend grant of guarantees for debt assumption or voluntary financial 
transferences for those government levels if the expenditure limit is not respected. It is important 
to notice that PPP Law doesn’t prohibit States and Municipals to exceed the limit; the Law just 
penalizes (financially) them. States and Municipals must inform previously Senate and National 
Treasury the allowance of the Law before contract PPP project. 
The transparency of obligations and risks assumed by government
9 had been regulated by 
Act n. 614/2006 of the National Treasury. Art. 7 establishes that public bodies must register on 
its sheets the estimated values of assumed risks guaranteed to private partner. Accounting 
registration methodology must reflect present value of all the obligations of public partner 
contained on contract. Moreover, the risks assumed by public partner must be registered as a 
debt for fiscal issues. 
Generally, PPP Brazilian legislation is in accordance with international principles on the 
subject. On fiscal responsibility matter, Brazil has gone forward, establishing limits to contract 
(assume expenditures of) PPPs. PPPs are a way to expand the public expenditures on the time, it 
                                                           
4 In Portuguese, Comitê Gestor das PPPs (CGP). 
5 In portuguese, Receita Corrente Líquida (RCL) which is the total receipts less transferences to States and 
Municpals Governments. 
6 Art. 22 of 11.079/2004 Law. 
7 Fundo Garantidor das Parcerias Público-Privadas (FGP). 
8 CAPM method would price the reduction of the financial risk involved on PPP Project.  
9 Mentioned by Sadka (2006) and FMI (2004) 
  3is important the establish limits for public expenditures commitments to guarantee fiscal 
sustainability on long run. 
 
 
3. INDIFERENCE CURVE OF PUBLIC INEFICENCY AND PRIVATE RISK 
PREMIUM 
 
Most part of the studies that treats about public expenditures efficiency uses non-
parametric methods, where a set of inputs (costs or goods and services) is compared to outputs 
(performance indices). In accordance to Alfonso (2007), the economic efficiency can be divided 
in: technical efficiency and alocative efficiency.  
Technical efficiency is defined when a unit of decision (country, governmental agency, 
company, etc) is able to get a maximum output for a fixed set of inputs, or it will be able to 
minimize production inputs, for a fixed level of output. The most common methodology for this 
purpose is the DEA Model (Data Envelopment Analysis). Allocative efficiency reflects the 
capacity of a unit of decision to use several inputs in the best proportionality to produce 
determined output. 
Customarily, works that apply the DEA methodology to measure efficiency formulate a 
comparative analysis of decision units. Alfonso, Schucknecht and Tanzi (2006) calculate the 
efficiency of 24 developing countries. The input variable is governmental expenditures on: 
current expenses, transferences, payment of interests, investment and education and health 
expenses. As an output to represent public sector efficiency, it was defined the following 
variables: (i) administrative (corruption, bureaucracy, informality of the economy and efficiency 
of the judiciary), (ii) educational (quality of the mathematics and sciences), (iii) health (infantile 
mortality and life expectancy), (IV) distributive (Gini coefficient), (v) economic stability 
(inflation and stability of the economic growth) e (vi) economic performance (unemployment 
and growth of the GDP).  
Figure 1 presents the results of this work. The table with notes and the ranking of the 
most (in) efficient countries is on Appendices 1.  
Figure 1 
Production Possibility Frontier (2001 – 2003) 
 
 Source: Afonso, Schucknecht e Tanzi (2006) 
  4Considering limitations of DEA methodology and the choice of those specific variables 
as an output, the article suggests that Brazil is one of the most inefficient countries in the sample. 
In Figure 1, the vertical distance between Brazil (0,75) and the border of efficiency (1,53) shows 
how the public sector efficiency indicator could be improved for a fixed expenditure quantity 
(efficiency in terms of output). The efficiency in terms of input is determined by horizontal 
distance between total level of expenditure of Brazil (46.6% the GDP) and the border (17,8%). 
These results indicate that, if Brazil were the most efficient country of the sample, it could spend 
17.8% of GDP and achieve the same output indicator of public sector. So, Brazil has an 
inefficiency "indirect cost" of 162% for public expenditures 
Boueri (2007) analyses Brazilian cities efficiency for the provision of the public services: 
school registrations (education), hospitals procedures (health) and garbage collection 
(urbanization). The constant returns of scale DEA model indicates a wastefulness of 70.4% of 
the public expenditures. Considering non-constant returns of scale model, the inefficient result is 
47.4% of financial resources.  
Ribeiro and Rodrigueses Júnior (2007) make an extension of the Alfonso, Schucknecht 
and Tanzi (2006) model and apply to 21 countries of Latin America. The results were similar. 
Brazil is the second worst country in efficiency ranking of public expense (0,613), losing only to 
Colombia (0,505). The results indicate that Brazil could save 40% of its resources without 
modifying the results of its indicators.  
In relation to public versus private inefficiency comparative analysis, Fourie and Burger 
(2000) mention that differences between government and private sector efficiency are difficult to 
analyze empirically (econometrics). In some cases, "products" of the government are not 
quantified. Moreover, the objectives of the public sector can be not only the "product" 
(efficiency), but also social and politics (equity) matters.  
Despite this fact, most part of authors identifies private sector as more efficient than the 
public sector for the resources management. FMI (2004) suggests, as general rule, that the 
private property is preferable to public when the prices of competitive market can be achieved. 
In such circumstances, private sector is guided by the market competition to sell products on the 
price that consumers desire to pay and by the stock market disciplines the profits amount.  
There are some markets failures as public goods that justify the government property. 
However, it is important to mention that if government level of inefficiency is significant high, 
market imperfection can be simply substitute by failures of government [FMI (2004)]. These 
arguments can justify the use of PPPs as a combination of government force with the private 
provision. The PPP does not solve market failures, but it minimizes the government failure risk. 
Fourie and Burger (2000) explain that the main argument for the government inefficiency 
for goods and services provision is the structure of incentives of the "bureaucrat". The 
motivations of the government officers are not only their obligations of the work, but their 
political objective as status or power maximization. The behavior of "bureaucrat" leads to a 
wrong allocation of the resources. There is a tendency to supply public goods above their 
necessary quantity [Brown and Jackson (1990)].  
Corry (1997) describes the benefits of private sector management for public investments, 
as in case of PPPs. First, the private sector has gains of efficiency due its greater flexibility, 
better administration and an incentives oriented behavior. Moreover, there is a better quality 
supply of services at the same price. Thus, focus in productivity and results; private sector has 
discretionary to identify excellent allocations, reducing costs of services for users. 
However, in relation to costs of financing investments, private sector has disadvantage 
compared to public sector. According to Sadka (2006), private sector typically acquires loans 
with higher interests than government. By this reason, the private sector applies a higher 
discounting rate of cashes flows, causing a negative impact for the attractiveness of the 
investment project. A project can present a positive net effect to government and negative to 
  5private sector. This fact will probably cause the rejection for private provision of public goods 
and services.  
A way to solve this problem is the government assumes that private partner adopts 
different method of pricing risk on the moment of projects evaluation. Government tends to use 
the risk free interests rate to discount future cash flows of the project. Private partner will use a 
risk premium on its discount rate. Thus, on PPP contracts that government assumes public 
payments for financial viability of the project, the cost of the private partner risk premium 
impacts positively public financial obligations (cost) or user’s price of services.  
By this reason, there is a trade-off between: (i) public sector inefficiency
10 for directly 
implementation of investment projects, defined as an "overpayment” of infrastructure and; (ii) In 
case of PPP project, financial costs of project by risk premium requested by private partner that 
will be financed by the government obligations or by user’s price of services.  
The proposed model has objective to quantify the inefficiency assumed for the public 
sector for a given risk premium demanded by private partner (financial cost) or, in other words, 
calculate the indifference curve between risk premium and public inefficiency. The objective of 
this curve is to subsidy government with an instrument that is able to indicate the best structure 




4. FINANCIAL MODEL 
 
Assume that implementation of a public infrastructure demands two phases: (a) 
construction and (b) maintenance (or management). Moreover, there are three forms of 
infrastructure implementation: (i) Simple Concession, (ii) Direct Public Administration or (iii) 
Public-Private Partnerships.  
(i)  Simple Concession: contracts which public sector authorizes private initiative to 
manage the infrastructure, charging users for the offered service. An important characteristic of 
concessions is the financial viability of the project. The simple concession is a financial auto-
sustainable project. Its future financial flow of user’s tariff receipts pays investments and 
operational costs of the infrastructure deducted by a discount rate.  
(ii)  Direct Public Investment: financial structure in which government is responsible 
to finance the necessary investments of the project and manage the maintenance of the 
infrastructure. Usually, government doesn’t tariff users for the offered services at infrastructure. 
(iii)  Public-Private Partnership: it is a “sponsored concession” where private initiative 
is responsible for investments and maintenance of the infrastructure. Users are charged for the 
offered services. However, the project is not financially auto-sustainable. It is necessary public 
transfers to assure the financial viability of the project.  
For a determined investment project, it is assumed that
11: (i) government decided to 
charge users for the infrastructure service, (ii) project is not financial auto-sustainable and (iii) 
government requests private sector to become responsible for maintenance of infrastructure. 
Consequently, there are two possibilities for the government:  
Option I: Contract PPP including construction (private sector) and maintenance 
(management) of the infrastructure (private sector).  
Option II: Divide implementation of infrastructure in two stages: (i) construction by 
direct public investment (public sector) and maintenance by simple concession contract (private 
sector). 
                                                           
10 Or private sector eficiency. 
11 The reason for these assumptions is to find an indifference situation between two options of project 
implementation.  
  6Moreover, assume for implementation of the project that:  
(i) The construction of the infrastructure takes only a year (year zero).  
(ii) Services receipts (user’s tariff) and operational expenditures are equal and will 
happen after year zero ( 1  T ). As consequence, in case of PPP contract, the financial amount of 
public transfers must be equal to the budget of construction infrastructure to assure the financial 
viability of the project, net present value = 0 (NPV) . 
(iii) There is no construction risk.  
(iv) If Option I, government will make its transfers by linear yearly payments during the 
contract, based on the service of infrastructure maintenance ( 1  T ). The transferred value will 
be enough to assure project’s NPV equal zero. Private sector will demand a “risk premium” for 
the government. 
(v) If Option II, by the fact the government is inefficient, there will be an “overpayment” 
(cost) for infrastructure construction.  
Option I has advantage of better efficiency of private sector for infrastructure 
construction. However, private initiative will demand a higher discount rate on NPV calculus to 
price risk premium ( ). The risk premium will be financed by public transfers (government 
higher financial cost).  
Option II has advantage of a lower financial cost for the government. In that case, the 
government opportunity cost of public resources is the risk free interest rate of the economy. 
However, it is assumed that construction of infrastructure directly by government will be 
inefficient, generating an overpayment (costs) for the government.  
 
 
4.1 OPTION I: CONSTRUTION AND MAINTENANCE BY PPP 
 
Considering assumptions (i) and (ii), the financial analysis of option I without public 
transfers is: 
I NPVT   0  
0 1   T NPV  
Thus,  
I NPVTotal    
Private Initiative must require for government the financial viability of the project, 
NPV=0. Thus, government has to make its annual linear payment to private sector to assure 
viability. According to assumption (iv), government will transfer in t periods after the 
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Where: I = Total investment. 
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The NPV total cost of government at the project is calculated by adding all transfers 
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Substituting (2) in (4), we find the total expenditure of the government in net present 
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  84.2 OPTION II: CONSTRUTION BY PUBLIC DIRECT INVESTIMENT AND 
MAINTENANCE BY SIMPLE CONCESSION 
 
In Option II, the government finances the necessary investments for construction of 
infrastructure and, after that, bids the infrastructure management for the private sector as a 
simple concession. As operational receipts and costs are equal in  1  T
12 [assumption (ii)], 
government will not have any cost on the simple concession contract for maintenance. However, 
government is responsible for infrastructure construction. It is assumed that the government is 
inefficient [assumption (v)]. Thus, project will have an extra expenditure (overpayment) of  % 
for its execution.  
The financial analysis of Option II is given by: 
 
I NPVT      ) 1 ( 0   
0 1   T NPV  
Thus, 
I NPVTotal     ) 1 (   
 
Where: I = Total investment. 
   = Government ineficiency, extra cost (%). 
Thus, the total governmental expenditure in case of option II in NPV is:  
 
I GInvPub     ) 1 (                                                                      (6) 
 
 
4.3 INDIFERENCE CURVE 
 
The indifference curve of private risk premium and public inefficiency is calculated 
considering a situation where the government is indifferent between financing the project by PPP 
(option I) or joint public investment and simple concession (Option II). Thus, it is necessary to 
make equal the government costs of both options (5) and (6): 
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                             (7) 
 
This is the function of public inefficiency in relation to the private premium risk  , 
interests rate i and period of contract n.  
This relation is a pricing method of the implicit public inefficiency on PPP contracts 
when it is determined the premium risk rate of project by private partner, usually calculated by 
CAPM model. If government estimates its inefficiency on the management of infrastructure 
                                                           
12 NPV=0 
  9projects
13, it can establish its optimal decision between PPP (Option I) or joint tradicional public 





This section presents simulations of the indifference curve of private risk premium and 
public inefficiency (“overcost” of government direct investment).  
The public inefficiency ( ) is a function of risk premium demanded by private sector 
( ), risk free interest rate of the economy (i) and the period of contract (n).  
 
 
5.1- 10 YEARS CONTRACTS 
 
Graph 1 presents the indifference curve of private risk premium and public inefficiency 
for different values of the economy risk free interest rates in a period of 10 years. 
It is observed that indifference curves are convex in relation to the premium risk rate
14. 
Moreover, the inefficiency is negative related to the risk free interest rates of the economy (i). 
The reason for this behavior is the formation rule of parameter   that equals the costs of 
government in Options I and II in net present value. As discount rate of NPV is fixed as i, there 




Indifference Curve of Private Risk Premium and Public Inefficiency 



































                                                           









  10Table 1 presents some referring values of assumed inefficiency and premium risk rate for 
i = 6% a.a. 
Table 1 
Risk Premium 5% 10% 15% 20%
Public Ineficiency 25% 52% 82% 112%
 Premium x Ineficiency Relation (i = 6% a.a.)
 
 
Indifference curves in Graph 1 indicate the optimal decision rule of financing investment 
projects. Based on estimations of public inefficiency
15 and the calculated risk premium 
demanded by private sector, government can determine if the project should be financed by PPP 
or joint direct public investment (construction) and simple concession (maintenance).  
The left superior area of the indifference curve indicates that assumed inefficiency is 
relatively higher than risk premium of private sector. Thus, the optimal decision is to implement 
infrastructure project by PPP. The risk premium required by private sector is relatively higher 
than inefficiency of public sector in inferior right area. In those cases, PPP is costly. The best 
decision is government direct investment plus simple concession.  
 
 
5.2- 15 YEARS CONTRACTS 
 
Graph 2 presents the indifference curve for a 15 years contract. The period increase of 
public payments (contract government transfers), influencing positively the risk premium-
inefficiency relation. The reason of this behavior is the higher financial costs of PPP contract 
occurred by longer duration of government annual transfers.  
Graph 2 
Indifference Curve of Private Risk Premium and Public Inefficiency 


































Table 2 presents some points of indifference curve for i = 6%a.a to be compared with 10 
years contract values. For a premium risk of 5%, it is observed that there is an increase from 
                                                           
15 One way is to use DEA methold.. 




Risk Premium 5% 10% 15% 20%
Public Ineficiency 35% 74% 116% 161%
Differen.% (Contract 10ys) 40% 42% 43% 43%




5.3- 20 YEARS CONTRACTS 
 
Graph 3 presents the indifference curves between risk premium and public inefficiency 
for contracts of 20 years.  The financial cost of public-private partnership contracts rises in 
relation to shorter period contracts. This fact can be visualized by the indifference curves 
inclination (required inefficiency). 
Graph 3 
Indifference Curve of Private Risk Premium and Public Inefficiency 



































It is verified, in Table 3, the relations between inefficiency and risk premium for values 
of 5%, 10%, 15% and 20%. There is an increase of assumed inefficiency in relation to the 
previous simulations. It is observed that the average increase of the inefficiency is 79% in 
relation to 10 years contract for a given premium risk. 
 
Table 3 
Risk Premium 5% 10% 15% 20%
Public Ineficiency 44% 93% 146% 201%
Differen.% (Contract 10ys) 76% 79% 79% 79%






  125.4- 30 YEARS CONTRACTS 
 
In 30-years contracts, it is observed that the assumed public inefficiency has a significant 
increase in relation to the previous simulations. This fact makes the choice in favor of public 
investment plus simple concession (Option II) to finance infrastructure. 
 
Graph 4 
Indifference Curve of Private Risk Premium and Public Inefficiency 





































It is important to mention that the assumed inefficiency sensibility for the risk free rate of 
the economy (i) increases for lengthen contracts. 
 
Table 4 
Risk Premium 5% 10% 15% 20%
Public Ineficiency 58% 123% 190% 258%
Differen.% (Contract 10ys) 134% 135% 133% 130%
 Premium x Ineficiency Relation (i = 6% a.a.)
 
 
Table 4 shows the value of the assumed public inefficiency that generates indifference 
between two contract options: PPP or public investment plus concession. It has a non linear 
positive relation with the period of contracts (n). The increase of public ineficency required, in 
relation to 10 years contract, is around 133%. 
 
 
6. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has the objective to analyze the relation between premium risk rate demanded 
by the private partner and the degree of inefficiency assumed to infrastructure provision by 
public sector. The indifference curve of private risk premium and public sector inefficiency is an 
indicator to subsidy government decision of public infrastructure projects implementation: public 
investment or PPP. 
The proposed financial model is determined by calculating the relationship between 
public sector inefficiency and private risk premium, assuming two equivalent options of 
  13infrastructure projects funding. This relationship determines public inefficiency as a function of 
the risk premium ( ), risk free interest rate of the economy (i) and period of the contract (n).  
Simulations indicates that public sector inefficiency has: (i) positive relation with risk 
premium demanded by private partner, (ii) negative relation with risk free interest rate of the 
economy and (iii) positive relation with the period of the contract. This work quantifies the 
sensibility of the model for these variables and indicates the optimal decision for government to 
the financing infrastructure configuration.  
The increase in the period of public transfers (payments) of PPP contracts (n) and the risk 
premium demanded by private partner ( ) influence positively the decision in favor of public 
investment (option II). The reason for this behavior is the increase of financial costs of PPP 
contracts by allonging public payments or the value of disconting rate (risk premium) of 
financial flow.  
The negative relation between public inefficiency and economy free risk interest rate (i) 
is determined by the formation rule of parameter . This parameter equals the government cost 
on the two proposed options in terms of net present value (NPV). As the discounting rate of NPV 
was established as i, it impacts negatively the financial cost of the project and, consequently, 
public inefficiency.  
This work aims to develop a model able to measure the implicit public inefficiency 
assumed in PPP contracts on the moment that private risk premium is determined. If government 
estimates its inefficiency on the management of infrastructure projects
16, it can establish its 
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  15APENDICES 1 
Public Sector Efficiency Indicator (2001 – 2003) 
 
Source: Afonso, Schucknecht e Tanzi (2006) 
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